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NOTES
Condominium:

A Reconciliation of

Competing Interests?
I. INMRODUCTION

As Americans have migrated to urban areas, the suburbs have grown
at an astounding pace, principally by means of single home subdivisions. Of necessity, this march to the suburbs must cease at some
point and people will begin to return to the central city and its closelying peripheral areas if for no other reason than to lessen the heavy
economic burden resulting from man-hours wasted in commuting
great distances. Often the alternative to the suburban home is an
apartment in the city. Apartment renting, however, runs counter to
a deeply ingrained American tradition of individual home ownership,
a tradition encouraged by favorable tax consequences.' It seems only
1. The homeowner may deduct state and local, and foreign real property taxes,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164(a) (1); and mortgage interest charges, INr. REV. CODE

oF 1954, § 163(a). In addition, there is a provision for the nonrecognition of gain
on the sale or exchange of the residence. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1034. However,
there is the ever present possibility that some or all of these tax advantages of the
homeowner may be eliminated. Former Special Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
Dan T. Smith, has suggested "It would be preferable not to allow deductions for any
taxes paid. . . . It would help remove the present discrimination in favor of homeowners who can deduct their property taxes, while renters have no deduction for
any part of their rent." Smith, New Ideas for a Revolution in Taxes, U.S. News &
World Report, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 67. "The interest deduction gives a further benefit
deduction might well be
to homeowners with mortgages over renters..... .The
removed as part of a general reform." Id. at 68. It has been suggested that property
owners have no vested interest in the present deductions and that an investment in
property should not be based solely upon expected tax deductions. 29 Mo. L. REV. 238
(1964). However, even if the possibility of the elimination of this deduction exists,
political realities would seem to militate against its elimination until the tradition
of homeownership abates to a substantial degree.
An indirect tax advantage received by the homeowner is the tax free imputed
income derived in the form of rent free use of the home. The value of the occupancy
is not presently taxed as income. In fact, there is dictum that "the rental value of
the building used by the owner does not constitute income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment." Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 379
(1934) (dictum). But if a renter invests an equivalent amount of wealth, he is
subject to income tax on the income received.
Another advantage derived by the homeowner was expressed thusly: "Rent includes
factors representing the costs of turnover in occupancy, such as loss of rents, renting
commissions and redecorating. Comparable costs exist also in ownership but they
are more within the control of the owner, due in part to the fact that owners take
better care of property than renters do and make less frequent changes in location."
Kerr, Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 11 (1963).
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natural that in this period of increasing urbanization the condominium

concept should be advanced as an attempt to reconcile these needs.
Its arrival on the property scene has attracted the intense interest of

2
potential apartment dwellers, developers, and legal writers.

Basically the condominium is a form of property ownership whereby
the owner has fee simple title to a single unit within a multi-unit

building with an undivided interest in the common elements-land,

hallways, swimming pools, heating plants, et cetera.3 Condominium

is a new form of ownership, not'a new estate or different kind of
property.4 It differs from the cooperative in that in the cooperative

the building is owned by a corporate or business entity which holds
title to all the premises and each cooperator is a shareholder with a
proprietary lease for one apartment.5

The present condominium activity6 was largely generated by section
2. Armstrong & Collins, Condominium-The Magic in a Word, So. CAL. 16th INST.
oN Fim. TAX 667 (1964); Beresford, Condominium in Michigan, 43 Mic. S.B.J. 13
(1964); Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLum. L.
BEv. 987 (1963); Berger, Condominium Primer For Fiduciaries,104 TnusTs & ESTATES
21 (1965); Cribbet, Home Ownership For Megalopolis?, 61 MicH. L. REv. 207 (1963);
Fokes, Legal and Practical Aspects of Condominium, 19 Bus. LAW. 233 (1963);
Gregory, Condominium Legislation, 38, CALIF. S.B.J. 69 (1963); Kenin, Condominium:
A Survey of Legal Problems and Proposed Legislation, 17 U. MIAM1r L. Rm,. 145
(1962); Kerr, supra note 1; Kreider, Ohio Condominium Act, 33 U. CiNc. L. REv. 463
(1964); Leyser, The Ownership of Flats-A Comparative Study, 7 INLr'L & Comr,. L.Q.
31 (1958); McCaughan, Florida Condominium Act Applied, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 1
(1964); Ramsey, Condominium, 9 PRAC. LAW. 21 (1963); Ramsey, Condominiums in
Louisiana-Act 494 of 1962, 10 LA. B.J. 219 (1963); Ross, Condominium in Californiathe Verge of an Era, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 351 (1963); Schwartz, Condominium-A
Hybrid Castle in the Sky, 44 B.U.L. REV. 137 (1964); Smith, The Case for Condominium
Law in Pennsylvania, 33 PA. B.A.Q. 513 (1962); Welfeld, Condominium and MedianIncome Housing, 31 FoRDrAm L. REv. 457 (1963); Condominium: A Symposium,
14 HASTINGS L.J. 189 (1963); Condominium: A Symposium, 41 TITLE NEWS 28
(1962); 13 Dr PA L L. 1Ev. 111 (1963); 11 DE PAurL L. REv. 319 (1962); 31
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1014 (1963); 77 HAv. L. REv. 777 (1964); 37 So. CALIF. L.
REV. 82 (1964); 37 TuL. L. R1v. 482 (1963); 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 203 (1962); 8
VmL. L. RET-.538 (1963); 2 WmLra.ass'E 434 (1963).
3. The Florida Condominium Act contains the following definition: "Condominium
is that form of ownership of condominium property under which units of improvements
are subject to ownership by different owners, and there is appurtenant to each
unit as part thereof an undivided share in the common elements." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 711.03(7) (Supp. 1964).
4. MeCaughan, supranote 2.
5. 4 PowELL, REAL PRopmETy f[ 633.1 (Boyer ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as 4
PoweLL].

6. While condominium activity is relatively new in the United States, the concept
itself was known to the ancient Romans. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory
Foundation, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 987 (1963). Separate ownership of portions of
buildings was recognized in the Middle Ages in some cities in France. Leyser, supra
note 2. "From Europe condominium went to Latin America, bypassing the continental
United States when Puerto Rico passed an HPA." [Horizontal Property Act-Title of
some condominium acts] Kerr, supranote 1.
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234 of the National Housing Act 7 which permits the Federal Housing
Administration to issue mortgage insurance on individual condominium units. While the section does not expressly, cover condominiums,
but rather, speaks in terms of "a one-family unit in a multifamily
structure and an undivided interest in the common areas and facilities
which serve the structure,"8 it clearly was intended to cover the
condominium. 9 At the time of the passage of this amendment, only
Puerto Rico had a condominium statute. 10 In a period of less than
four years, forty-four states and the District of Columbia" have passed
condominium legislation giving statutory basis to this form of owner-

ship.
This note will first examine some of the operative provisions of
the condominium statutes. Particular emphasis will be placed upon
those provisions which are basic to the creation, existence, and
dissolution of this unique form of property ownership. The FHA
Model Statute For Creation of Apartment Ownership 2 will be the
principal vehicle of analysis, for it is the basis of many of the state
condominium statutes. State provisions which differ from the Model
Act will then be examined to discover the best statutory answer to
the needs of condominium housing. Finally, attention will be focused
on the tax implications of the condominium, principally from the
developer's viewpoint. This will, of course, necessitate an examination
of the functional problems that arise in tax planning.

II.

NEED FOR PEminssivE LEGISLATION

While the present interest in the condominium has been created
principally by the rapid spread of condominium legislation, it should
be recognized that a condominium may be created by contract 3 if the
following conditions are allowed under.state common or statutory law:
(1) ownership of part of the building as an interest in land;
(2) restraint against the partition of the commonly-owned land
and partitions of the building;
7. National Housing Act of 1961 § 234, 75 Stat. 160 (1961), 12 U.S.C. § 1715y
(Supp.IV 1963).
8. 75 Stat. 160 (1961), 12 U.S.C. § 1715y(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).

9. 31 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1014 (1963).
10. Kerr, supra note 1.
11. Berger, The Condominium-Cooperative Comparison, 11 Pn~c. LA.v. 37 (1963).
12. [Hereinafter cited as the MoDEL Acv.]
13. "The common law . . . never adopted a dogmatic attitude with regard to the
existence of ownership rights over separate parts of a building. Such rights are
mentioned in Coke on Littleton, and such 'superimposed freeholds' have existed in
England 'in various places for a long time." Leyser, supra note 6, at 50-51.
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(3) restraint against the separation of the share in the commonlyowned property from the separately-owned unit;
(4) separate assessment of units for taxation;
(5) provision for the use, management, and maintenance of the
commonly-owned property; or, more briefly stated, provisions
for operation of the condominium. 14
Obviously, it is difficult to find all of these conditions co-existing in
a particular jurisdiction. However, a number of condominiums were
constructed upon a common law framework in Florida, California, and
Utah; 15 but the circumstances of their creation may be unique in that
each of these states subsequently passed condominium legislation. 16
Perhaps these common law condominiums were partly inspired by the
belief that such enabling legislation was imminent.
The absence of a condominium statute necessitates convincing all
parties involved that the division of the air space above the land
surface is practical and legal.17 The difficulty of guaranteeing that the
listed conditions exist places a heavy burden on the developer and
creates doubt as to the feasibility of the condominium without specific
legislation. As one condominium observer noted: "Condominium, it
appears, can exist under the common law, but whether it will flourish
without statutory provision is doubtful."18
Assuming the necessity for permissive legislation in order to give
the certainty required by the real estate community and institutional
lenders, what form should it take? Broadly speaking, a condominium
statute must: (1) provide for the establishment of the condominium;
(2) accommodate existing legislation dealing with recording procedures, taxation of property, liens, land-use control, to the unique
requirements of the condominium; (3) provide a means of preserving
unity and harmony of condominium projects by prohibiting suit for
partition of the common areas; and (4) provide for the dissolution of
the condominium. 19 Subsequent discussion will examine in more detail
the nature of some of these statutory prerequisites.
III. CREATION OF CONDOMINIUM

The condominium statutes, or horizontal property acts as they are
14. Supra note 4, at 2.
15. Berger, supra note 6.
16. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1350-59; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.01-23 (Supp. 1964); UTA,
CODE ANxs. § 57-8-1 to 35 (1963).
17. Smith, supra note 2.
18. Berger, supra note 6.
19. 77 HAnv. L. REV. 777 (1964).

NOTES

1777

sometimes called, 20 prescribe the exclusive means whereby property
may be submitted to their terms. The FHA Model Act provides:
"The Act shall be applicable only to property, the sole owner or all
of the owners of which submit the same to the provisions hereof by
21
duly executing and recording a Declaration as hereinafter provided."
While some of the acts vary in wording, the uniform requirement of
filing a declaration removes any doubt as to whether a particular
building has been submitted to the terms of the condominium act.22
The declaration provides for descriptions of the land on which the
condominium is constructed,23 the building, 24 the individual apartments,2 the common elements, and the limited common elements
and the unit to which they are appurtenant.2 7 It sets forth the value
of the property and of each apartment and the percentage of the
undivided interest in the common elements.2 The name of a person
to receive service of process 29 and the purposes for which the building and each apartment are intended and restricted 30 as to use are
likewise included in the declaration. Finally, the declaration may
contain any further details as to the condominium which may be
deemed desirable, including the method by which the declaration may
be amended, 31 so long as they are consistent with the enabling
32
legislation.
Once the declaration has been filed and the building constructed,
the question may arise whether a purchaser of an apartment takes an
interest in real property. The Model Act provides specifically that each
apartment together with its common elements "shall for all purposes
constitute real property."3 Such an express provision seems preferable
to those statutes4 which remain silent on this point, for it eliminates
possible litigation and quells any fears of mortgage lenders created by
the statutory void.35 But as noted in the next section, this precludes
the creation of a condominium on a leasehold. If the legislature does
20. Aim. STAT. ANN.§ 50-1001. (Supp. 1963).
21. MODEL ACT § 3; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-f.
22. Anm. STAT. ANN. § 50-1003 (Supp. 1963); CAL. CIV. CODE
Supp. 1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.08 (Supp. 1964).
23. MODEL ACT § 11 1.
24. MODEL ACT § 11 2.
25. MODEL ACT § 11 3.
26. MODEL ACT § 11 4.
27. MODEL ACT § 11 5.
28. MODEL ACT § 11 6.
29. MODEL ACT § 11 8.

ACT § 11 7.

30.

MODEL

32.

MODEL ACT § 11 11.
MODEL ACT § 4.

31. MODEL ACT § 110.
33.

34. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.1-33 (Supp. 1964).

35. Kenin, supra note 2, at 153.

§ 1351 (Deering
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not deem such a restriction inconsistent with the condominium form
of ownership, a proviso should be included to specifically permit the
creation of a condominium on a leasehold, retaining the above provision to identify the interest where the regime is created on a fee
simple absolute.
IV. LEASEHOLDS

The various condominium statutes are not uniform on the question
of whether a condominium may be created on a leasehold. The FHA
Model Act would seem to preclude the use of a leasehold interest in
land, for it defines property as and including "the land, the building,
all improvements and structures thereon, all owned in fee simple
absolute."3 It further defines an apartment owner as a "person or
persons owning an apartment in fee simple absolute and an undivided
interest in fee simple of the common areas and facilities." 7 An
owner cannot have a fee simple absolute in his particular unit if the
building is constructed on a leasehold. 38 Therefore, statutes patterned
after the FHA Model Act would preclude the construction of a
condominium on a leasehold, regardless of its duration.
The same result would seem to be reached under the Florida statute.
It defines a condominium parcel as a "separate parcel of real property,
the ownership of which may be in fee simple, or any other estate in

real property recognized by law."39 The interest of a lessee is personal

property, not real property. 40 The Florida statute is an example of
poor draftmanship, for the authors of the act did not intend to
preclude the creation of a condominium on a leasehold, considering
this an undesirable interference with private property. 41 However, the
end product negated the creation of a condominium on a leasehold as
effectively as if they had drawn the statute to expressly accomplish
this result.
Other states have not restricted the condominium to a fee simple
absolute as evidenced by the Virginia statute which specifically provides for the leasehold by stating, "'Property' means and includes the
land whether leasehold or in fee simple and the building, all improvements and structures thereon and all easements, rights and appurtenances belonging thereto." 42 It is submitted that this is the preferable view, for there appears to be no legislative purpose served
36. MoDEL ACT § 2(m); N.Y. REAL Pnop. LAw § 339-e(11) (Emphasis added.)
37. MoDEL ACT § 2(b). New York defines unit owner as the "person or persons
owning a unit in fee simple absolute." N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 339-e 15.
38. 4 POWELL 633.19.
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.04 (Supp. 1964).
40. 2 PowELL, REAL PnoPETY fr 222 (1950) [hereinafter cited as 2 POWE.LL].
41. McCaughan, supra note 2, at 29.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.2(m) (Supp. 1964).

ir
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by precluding the construction of a condominium on property held
under a long-term lease.43 In fact, it automatically avoids one problem
that may tend to tie up land in the case of a fee simple absolute.
Generally, unless provided otherwise in the conveyance, the unit
owner receives an absolute fee in the air space his apartment
occupies if the condominium is created on a fee simple absolute.4
Upon total destruction and a decision not to rebuild, the fee in the
cube of air space may be construed as remaining in the individual
unit owner. 45 While the problems created by destruction will be
discussed subsequently, it should be observed that unless the conveyance or the condominium statute divests the unit owner of his
fee, the marketability of the property after the destruction will depend
upon obtaining unanimous consent of all the unit owners.4 This raises
the specter of a recalcitrant unit owner refusing to convey unless he
receives an exhorbitant price for his fee interest. This problem cannot
arise in the case of a leasehold.
The use of a leasehold, however, creates a unique problem of its
own. One of the principal advantages of the condominium is the
independence of the condominium unit owner from the financial
obligations of the other unit owners. This is contrasted with the
cooperative which is burdened by a single blanket mortgage and a
single tax assessment, the effect of which is to create a financial interdependence among the cooperative shareholders to collectively meet
the mortgage and tax payments in order to prevent a lien on the overall project. The individual condominium unit is treated as a separate
entity for both mortgage and taxation purposes with the unit owner
liable exclusively for mortgage charges and tax assessments on his
individual unit.
A lease on a condominium runs to the whole project and can create
a problem in the event one owner does not pay his share, since it
may be necessary for the other owners to meet this obligation in
order that their interest will not be encumbered. This result can be
avoided by proper planning, as it may be possible to divide the
lease into separate leases with one covering each unit.47 An alternative
would be a non-disturbance agreement obtained from the fee owner
whereby he agrees not to disturb possession of any unit owner who
43. McCaughan, supra note 2, takes a contrary view. However, his objection is
based on the fact that the lease would destroy the condominium owner's freedom
from liability incurred by the other owners. As will be noted subsequently, by
proper planning a condominium owner can retain financial independence from the
other owners, even when the condominium is created on a leasehold.
44. 4 POWELL f 633.12(3).

45. Borgwardt, The Condominium, 36 CALiF. B.J. 603 (1961).
46. Ibid.
47. Kerr, supra note 1, at 24.
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pays his proportionate part of the rent.48 As the problems inherent

in a leasehold can be negated by adequate planning, there appears
little reason to restrict the condominium to a fee simple absolute.
V. COMMERCIAL USE

While the condominium has generally been thought of in terms of
residential units, there is no reason why the concept should not be
applied to commercial units,49 or a combination of commercial and
residential units where zoning permits. 50 In fact, the condominium
concept is already being employed in some areas of the United States
for office buildings, mobile home parks, and small boat harbors."'

Some persons believe that the greatest potential of the condominium

52
lies in the commercial rather than the residential field.
State permissive legislation, such as the Massachusetts statute,
authorizing the construction and sale of condominiums "designed

primarily for dwelling purposes,"5 3 appears unduly restrictive. While
a combination of residential and commercial units seems permissible

as long as it is "primarily for dwelling purposes," it would preclude
an entirely commercial condominium. The better view is demon-

strated by the Arkansas statute where apartment is defined as
occupying "all or part of a floor in a building of one (1) or more

floors or stories regardless of whether it be designed for residence,
48. Ibid.
49. The FHA Regulations regarding the eligibility of an individual condominium
unit for mortgage insurance impliedly recognize that a unit may be rented, while
at the same time limiting the number that can be rented by the individual insured.
"(e) Mortgagor Limitations. The family unit to be covered by an insured mortgage
shall be for the use and occupancy of the mortgagor or the mortgagor shall be the
owner of another family unit covered by an insured mortgage for such use and
occupancy. The mortgagor may not own more than four family units coverd by
insured mortgages, one of which shall be for his own use and occupancy." 24 C.F.R.
§ 234.26(e) (1962). The character of the rental use is also limited. "No family
unit in a multitamily structure which has been committed to a plan of apartment
ownership shall be rented or offered for rent for transient or hotel purposes as defined
in § 234.15 so long as such family unit in such structure is subject to an FHA
insured mortgage." 24 C.F.R. § 234.67 (1962). Section 234.15 defines hotel purposes
as follows: "For the purpose of this subchapter rental for transient or hotel purposes
shall mean (a) rental for any period less than 30 days; or (b) any rental if the
occupants of the unit are provided customary hotel services such as room service
for food and beverages, maid service, furnishing and laundering of linen, and bellboy
service." 24 C.F.R. § 234.15 (1962).
50. See Beresford, supra note 2.
51. Wenig & Schulz, Government Regulation of Condominium in California, 14
HASTInGs L.J. 222 (1963). "The concept of fee conveyance of cubes of water space
for boat storage together with tenancy in common ownership of the pilings, ramps,
walkways, service area, clubhouse, parking area is referred to as the 'vet condominium."' Id. at 233 n.6.
52. See 4 POWELL II 632 n.4 and the authorities cited therein.
53. MAss. GEiN. LAws ANN. ch. 183A, § 1 (Supp. 1964).
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for office, for the operation of an
industry or business, or for any
54
other type of independent use."
VI. PAR=TrrON

Once the condominium is established, attention must be turned
to the preservation of the regime. By definition, the individual unit
owners of the condominium hold the common elements in co-tenancy. 55 One of the characteristics of a co-tenancy is the right of
partition 56 and, in the absence of a provision to restrain the exercise
of this right, the condominium regime may be dissolved by a single
disgruntled unit owner. Such partition could result in a physical
division of the property with the individual unit owners receiving a
several interest corresponding to his share of the individual interest or
57
a sale and division of the proceeds.
The possibility of a single unit owner disappointing the expectations
of the legal integrity of the regime would practically preclude condominium activity. To meet this threat, most of the statutes expressly
provide that no action for partition may be maintained. For example,
the Model Act provides:
The common areas and facilities shall remain undivided and no apartment
owner or any other person shall bring any action for partition or division
of any part thereof. . . . Any covenant to the contrary shall be null and
void.58

The Model Act recognizes the right of all of the unit owners to
remove the property from the provisions of the condominium statute 59
and that in the event of destruction with a decision not to rebuild,
a partition suit may be maintained. 60
Not all of the statutes 61 expressly bar a partition action, and in, such
cases it would seem necessary to provide against this contingency in
the declaration. The danger in these states is that a covenant not to
54. Anx.

STAT. ANN. § 50-1002(a) (Supp. 1963).
55. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-7 (1963).

56. 4 POWvLL II 611.
57. Rubens, Right of First Refusal and Waiver of the Right of Judicial Partition, 14
HAsTiNcs L.J. 255 (1963).
58. MODEL AcT § 6(c); Aid,. STAT. ANN. § 50-1007 (Supp. 1963); CAL. Crv. CODE

§ 1354 (Deering Supp. 1963).
59. MODEL AcT § 16; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.16 (Supp. 1964); New York provides
for the withdrawal and partition if "authorized by at least eighty per cent in number
or in common interest, or in both number and common interest, as may be specified
in the by-laws." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-t.
60. MODEL Acr § 26; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-cc.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 55.79.1 to -79.33 (Supp. 1964).
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partition may be construed as an indirect restraint on alienation. 2
However, a covenant not to partition for a reasonable length of time,
will generally be upheld if for a reasonable purpose.6 The restraint
on partition seems manifestly reasonable in this instance, since the
possibility that a single unit owner may bring a partition action is
likely to have a greater restraining effect on the alienability of
property than any bar to partition. 64 A reasonable length of time for
such restriction has been suggested as either the duration of the
condominium regime or the life of the building, whichever is shorter."5
Although, in the absence of a statutory provision barring partition
a covenant can be drafted that will be upheld against the contention
that it is invalid as a restraint against alienation, an express bar in the
condominium statute seems preferable. Such a provision would tend
to eliminate any litigation on this sensitive prerequisite to the vitality
of a condominium, for it would also clearly manifest the legislature's
intention to exclude the condominium from the effects of the rule
against restraints on alienation.
The integrity of the condominium is further maintained by statutory
provisions that "the common interest shall not be separated from the
unit to which it appertains." 66 Such a provision disposes of any question of whether the common elements are conveyed, 67 even though
they are not expressly mentioned in the conveying instrument.68
VII. SEPARATE AsSESSmNT
The financial independence of the individual unit owner depends
partly upon a separate assessment and liability for property taxes.
But in the absence of a statutory mandate, separate assessment is not
assured. The assessor in such a case is confronted with three alternate
methods of assessing the condominium: (1) a blanket assessment of
the total regime; (2) assessment of the actual unit individually with a
blanket assessment of the common elements; and (3) an individual
assessment of each unit, including the proportionate interest in the
common elements. By the weight of authority, the method selected
is within the discretion of the assessor.69 When the assessor exercises
62. Sv Es & SMIuTHr, FuruRE INTEREsTs § 1141 (2d ed. 1956). See generally Note,
18 VAND. L. REV. 1810 (1965).
63. 4 POWELL 1 633.11[2].

64. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 CoLum. L. Rnv.

987, 1015 (1963).
65. 4 POWELL 633.11 [2].
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. 711.05 (1) (2) (Supp. 1964); N.Y. REAL Pnop. LAw § 339-12.
67. See 13 DE PAuL L. REv. 111 (1963).
68. See Note, supra note 62, for a discussion of the problems inherent in a right of
first refusal.
69. Annot., 80 A.L.R. 867 (1932).
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this discretion, he will probably select the blanket assessment, for
separate assessment necessarily increases the assessor's administrative
burden by creating
additional as well as difficult tax billing and
70
valuation problems.
In the absence of a specific statutory provision requiring separate
assessment, the owners of the condominium might enter into an
agreement with the assessor to tax the condominium units severally;
however, this will not meet the FHA requirements for mortgage
insurance. The FHA requires the mortgagee of a section 234 mortgage
to certify that "property taxes in the jurisdiction where the family
units are located are assessed and levied against each family unit as
a taxable entity and not assessed and levied against the multifamily
structure." 71 This condition precedent to the issuance of mortgage
insurance clearly is not met when the assessment is on a building
rather than on a unit basis,72 nor is it satisfied if the assessor merely
agrees to assess on an individual basis. 73 The enabling act must
require assessment against the individual unit and its proportionate
share of the common elements.
To maintain the legal separateness implicit in the condominium and
to attempt to meet the FHA regulations for mortgage insurance, 74
the condominium acts generally provide expressly for separate assessment. Since the acts are not uniform in their approach, the purpose
of this section is to examine the statutory provisions and attempt to
ascertain the preferable statutory view.
The FHA Model Act provides:
Each apartment and its percentage of undivided interest in the common
areas and facilities shall be deemed to be a parcel and shall be subject
to separate assessment and taxation by each assessing unit and special district

for all types of taxes authorized by law including but not limited to special
ad valorem levies and special assessments. Neither the building, the property
nor any of the common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be a parcel. 75

It should be noted that the Model Act provides that the assessment is
made as to the unit and its proportionate share of the common
elements. This would certainly seem necessary to meet the FHA
mortgage insurance requirements.
The Arkansas statute differs by directing the separate assessment
to the unit only:
70. 50 CALIF. L. REv. 299, 326 (1962).
71. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(d) (3) (1962).
72. See 14 HAsINncs L.J. 289 (1963).
73. Wenig & Schulz, supra note 51, at 234.
74. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26 (1962).
75. MODEL Act § 22; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339y.
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Taxes, assessments and other charges of this State, or of any political sub-

division . . . shall be assessed against and collected on each individual
apartment, each of which shall be carried on the tax books as a separate
and distinct entity for that purpose, and not on the building or property as
a whole.

76

Presumably, the assessor could make a separate assessment of the
individual units and a blanket assessment of the common elements.
This would partially destroy the financial independence of the unit
owners, for if one owner failed to contribute his share toward the
blanket assessment of the common elements, the other owners must
meet this obligation or have the common elements encumbered with
a tax lien.
In practice, even under an Arkansas-type provision, the assessor
will probably choose to include the individual unit's proportionate
share of the common elements in a single assessment. Assessing the
common elements on a blanket basis would not seem particularly
advantageous to the assessor for he would still have as many separate
assessments on his rolls as if he had included the proportionate share
of the common elements in the individual assessments. 77 In fact, the
valuation is simplified if the common elements are included in the
individual units. To compute the proper assessment, the assessor
could merely determine the value of the building and allocate to the
individual share its proportionate part according to that unit's interest
in the common elements. If the common facilities are assessed as a
whole, the assessor would be required to value each individual unit
separately and then subtract the sum of these assessments from the
total value of the building. Regardless of whether in practice the
assessor may include the common elements in the individual unit
assessments, leaving this discretion in the assessor's hands precludes
FHA mortgage insurance. Since much of the present condominium
interest was generated by section 234 of the National Housing Act,
it would seem that the statutes should strive to conform to its provisions. Therefore, it would appear preferable for the condominium
acts to have a provision requiring the separate assessment to include
that unit's proportionate interest in the common elements.
Statutory authority for separate assessment may be particularly
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1023 (Supp. 1963). Apartment is defined in a manner
not inclusive of the common elements. "'Apartment' means an enclosed space consisting of one [1] or more rooms occupying all or part of a floor in a building of
one [1] or more floors or stories regardless of whether it be designed for residence,
for office, for the operation of any industry or business, or for any other type of
independent use, provided it has a direct exit to a thoroughfare or to a given
common space leading to a thoroughfare." Anx. STAT. ANN. § 50-1002(a) (Supp.
1963).
77. Wenig & Schulz, supra note 51.

1965 ]

NOTES

1785

important to those jurisdictions permitting a condominium regime on

a leasehold. The lessor continues to hold the legal title and, ordinarily,
the primary duty of meeting the tax obligation devolves upon the title
holder.18 If the taxes are assessed to the lessor and if he fails to meet
them, a lien encumbers the entire regime. Of course, the declaration
could contain an agreement that the condominium association was
responsible for these taxes; however, this might merely result in a
blanket assessment. In addition, tax assessors may be reluctant to
assess for property tax purposes anything less than a fee simple
interest.79 It would seem advantageous, therefore, to provide specific
statutory authority for separate assessment of less than a fee simple
interest. While this is no doubt implied in jurisdictions such as
Virginia where the condominium statute expressly provides for separate assessment 80 and the act permits a condominium on a leasehold, 81
an express provision on this point would negate any doubt.
VIII. DsmucrroN
So far the discussion has centered on problems arising in the
creation and continuation of the condominium. This section deals
with destruction of the condominium. Three basic statutory approaches are taken to this matter, the first of which is demonstrated
by the Arkansas statute which provides:
Reconstruction shall not be compulsory where it comprises the whole or
more than two-thirds (%) of the building. In such case, and unless otherwise unanimously agreed upon by the co-owners, the indemnity shall be
delivered pro rata to ihe co-owners entitled to it in accordance with provision made in the by-laws or in accordance with a decision of three-fourths
(1) of the co-owners if there is no by-law provision. 82

Under this approach, where more than two-thirds of the building is
destroyed, unless there is unanimous agreement to the contrary, the
funds received from the insurance and the sale of lands are distributed
to the owners. Upon such a contingency, the joint interest in the
common elements is converted into a several interest.
The Model Act provides that if within a specified number of days
from the date of destruction, the owners have not decided to reconstruct, the remaining property is deemed to be owned in common
by the unit owners.
78. An agreement can be made whereby the lessee agrees to pay the taxes. See

2 POWELL ff 241, at 283. But note subsequent text.

79. Wenig & Schulz, supra note 51, at 294.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.14 (Supp. 1964).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.2(m) ,(Supp. 1964).
82. ARK.STAT. ANN. § 50-1021 (Supp. 1963).
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days of the date of the damage or destruction to all or
If, within [-]
part of the property, it is not determined by the Association of Apartment
Owners to repair, reconstruct or rebuild, then and in that event:
(a) The property shall be deemed to be owned in common by the apartment

owners;
(b) The undivided interest in the property owned in common which shall
appertain to each apartment owner shall be the percentage of undivided

interest previously owned by such owner in the common areas and
facilities;

(c) Any liens affecting any of the apartments shall be deemed to be
transferred in accordance with the existing priorities to the percentage
of the undivided interest of the apartment owner in the property as
provided herein; and

(d) The property shall be subject to an action for partition at the suit of
any apartment owner, in which event the net proceeds of sale, together
with the net proceeds of the insurance on the property, if any, shall
be considered as one fund and shall be divided among all the apartment owners in a percentage equal to the percentage of undivided
interest owned by each owner in the property, after first paying out of
the respective shares of the apartment owners, to the extent sufficient for

the purpose, all liens on the undivided interest in the property owned
83
by each apartment owner.

The third approach is to leave the provisions governing the disposition of property after destruction or damage to be determined by the
declaration. The Florida statute provides the declaration shall contain: "Such other provisions not inconsistent with the law as may be
desired, including but not limited to those relating to... reconstruction or repair after casualty and votes required in connection therewith."84

If a fee simple absolute in the air space is conveyed to the owner
of the apartment, then even if the building is destroyed, the owner's
fee interest in this air space remains.a Whenever a statute or declaration provides that the fee interests of the owners divest and then
vest as tenants in common upon the happening of certain contingencies, an executory interest arises. The form of the Arkansas and
Model Condominium statutes creates an executory interest which
becomes possessory upon the destruction of the buildings and a
decision not to reconstruct. 86 Since these contingencies have no
relation to lives in being plus twenty-one years, the executory interest
would seem void under the rule against perpetuities.8 7
This application of the rule against perpetuities can be specifically
negated in the condominium act. The Missouri statute provides: "It
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

MODEL AcT § 26.

FLA.STAT. ANN.§ 711.08(1) (Supp. 1964).

Berger, supra note 64, at 1013.
4 POWELL 1633.12 [3].
Ibid.

1965 ]

NOTES

1787

is expressly provided that the rule of property known as the rule
against perpetuities and the rule of property known as the rule
restricting unreasonable restraints on alienation shall not be applied
to defeat any of the provisions of this chapter." 88 A number of
statutes, however, do not have such a provision. 89 - If the vesting of
a tenancy in common was provided for in the declaration, such as in
a Florida-type statute, the rule against perpetuities would clearly be
violated. However, if the tenancy in common is created by the
condominium act itself, such as in the Arkansas and Model Act, it
would seem that the intention of the legislature was to create an
exception to the rule against perpetuities, for otherwise the terms
of the act would be defeated.90 To eliminate any doubt on this
point, it seems preferable to provide an express statutory provision
stating the rule against perpetuities has no application to any part of
the condominium act. 9'
In the absence of a statutory provision negating the rule against
perpetuities, it has been suggested that the best method of avoiding
the problem is to convey to the unit owner a tenancy in common to
the air space occupied by his apartment, rather than a fee simple
absolute, along with the common elements. 92 Thus, at the inception
of the regime, the apartment owner would receive a fee simple
absolute in the walls, floors and ceiling of his apartment, along with
an easement to the air space encompassed by them. Upon destruction
of the building and failure to rebuild, the easement in the air space
terminates and the owner holds the common elements, including the
air space, as a tenant in common with the rest of the owners. Since
the interest in the air space has been continually vested in all the
owners of the condominium, the rule against perpetuities is not
violated. 93 This is a particularly good solution under a Florida-type
statute.
IX. THE CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPER
Since the principal characteristics of condominium legislation have
been examined, attention will now be turned to some of the problems
inherent in developing a condominium under these statutes. Generally, it is the developer who initiates the construction and development of a condominium; and, from his standpoint, it closely resembles
88. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 448.210 (Supp. 1964).
89. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. AzNN. § 50-1001-1023 (Supp. 1963); VA. CODE ANN. §
55-79 to -79.33 (Supp. 1964).
90. 4 PoWELL ff 633.12 [3].
91. See Cribbet, Condominium-Home Ownership For Megalopolis?, 61 MICH. L.
REv. 1207, 1233 (1963).
92. 4 PowE. ff 633.12[5].
93. ibid.
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a subdivision. Instead of a horizontal subdivision with single units
built upon separate lots, the condominium may be characterized as
a three dimensional subdivision of vertical fee simple units with an
undivided interest in the land and other common elements.9 4 From
this analysis of the condominium, it is apparent that, while it creates
many unique problems, many of the problems confronted by the
horizontal developer will likewise confront the condominium developer in only a slightly different context.
Perhaps in most instances the developer will desire to construct
a condominium devoted entirely to residential units, to sell all of
the units as rapidly as possible and then to completely withdraw
from any further activity in regard to the particular condominium.
But the economic realities may be such that it is desirable to include
commercial units or hold some of the residential units for rental
purposes. For example, projected sales demand schedules may indicate that the demand for the purchase of individual apartment units
falls short of that required to make the condominium venture successful. There are certain fixed costs in the construction of any type of
structure and the greater the number of units these fixed costs are
divided by, the lower will be the cost per unit. Since it is anticipated
that a substantial number of condominiums will be constructed close
to business districts in metropolitan areas, an area of high land cost,
the land itself will constitute a major fixed cost. High land cost may
make the condominium venture profitable only if a high rise structure,
having a large number of rental units in relation to ground space, is
constructed. By renting some of the units, the developer may find that
not only is he able to build the optimum sized building, but that he
has created an attractive investment in the units retained for rental.
Of course, the developer might have built a building devoted entirely
to rental. However, the sale of some of the units permits him to
recoup a portion of his investment in the initial stages and to diversify
his investments if he decides to retain the rental units himself.
If the condominium is constructed in or near the business district,
the land is likely to be so expensive as to preclude its use solely for
residential purposes. Therefore, to make the optimum use of the
location, it may be desirable and necessary to use the ground floor for
retail stores or other commercial purposes. Persons purchasing individual units may find the construction of commercial rental units
equally advantageous, since permitting the developer to build to
optimum size permits him to sell all units at a lower cost. In addition,
94. Of course, a multiunit single story condominium may be create]. How~vr,
this note shall concern itself principally with the problems inherent in th? h'.h rise
type condominium.
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if the developer must sell all the units rather than rent some, and finds
that after an intensive sales effort he has certain units unsold, he may
be tempted to sell these at a reduced price. This is likely to have a
depressing effect upon the value of the individual units previously
purchased. Including retail stores in the condominium may also make
it a more convenient place to live.
The above discussion of the practical reasons why a developer might
include commercial units and rental apartments in a proposed building has been premised on the assumption that the developer will
choose to build a condominium. However, the cooperative also
provides a vehicle to accomplish the same goals. The discussion to
follow will compare the tax implications of the cooperative and the
condominium with regard to the retention of commercial and rental
apartments, seeking to find the superior form of ownership to
accomplish the developer's objectives of providing low cost housing
with a reasonable rate of investment return to him.
X. COMPARISON OF CONDOMINIUm WfTH COOPERATIVE

The condominium appears distinctly superior to the cooperative in

regard to the retention of commercial units or apartments for rental
investment. The Internal Revenue Code permits the cooperator to
deduct his pro rata share 95 of the mortgage interest 96 and property
taxes.97 However, there is a restrictive definition of "Cooperative
Housing Corporation" which must be satisfied in order to get the
deduction. The Code defines it as a corporation:
(1)

COOPERATIVE HOUSING CORPORATION-

(A) having one and only one class of stock outstanding,
(B) each of the stockholders of which is entitled, solely by reason of
his ownership of stock in the corporation, to occupy for dwelling
purposes a house, or an apartment in a building, owned or leased
by such corporation.
(D) 80 per cent or more of the gross income of which for the taxable
year in which the taxes and interest described in subsection (a)

are paid or incurred is derived from tenant-stockholders.9 8

(2)

term 'tenant-stockholder' means an individual who is a stockholder in a cooperative housing corporation, and
TENANT-STOCKHOLDER-The

whose stock is fully paid up in an amount not less than an amount
shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate as bearing a
95. The cooperator pays a periodic assessment rather than rent. He is permitted to
deduct that proportion of the assessment which constitutes mortgage interest and
property taxes.
96. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 216(a)(1).
97. Ibid.

98.

INT. REv. CODE OF

1954, § 216(b) (1).
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reasonable relationship to the portion of the value of the corporation's

equity in the houses or apartment building and the land on which it
is situated which is attributable to the house or apartment which such

individual is entitled to occupy. 99

This definition does not preclude the cooperative from renting
altogether. Ownership of stock by a corporate stockholder will not
prevent the cooperative from qualifying as a "cooperative housing
corporation," providing eighty per cent of its gross income is derived
from individual tenant-stockholders. 10 Nor would it appear that the
deduction would be disallowed where the cooperative itself rents units,
if no more than twenty per cent of its gross income is composed of such
rentals. 1 1 However, it does restrict the cooperative's renting potential
and may place it in a perilous position in some instances. For example,
if it was necessary for the cooperative corporation to take over any
of the apartments by virtue of a default or a first refusal provision,
and the rental income was then close to twenty per cent of the gross
income, the cooperative might be placed in a position of either
allowing an apartment to remain vacant or losing its deduction by
renting and thereby exceeding the twenty per cent limitation. This
twenty per cent restriction can be circumvented to an extent. The
individual tenant-stockholder is not required actually to occupy the
apartment; it is sufficient if he has the right to occupy it.0 2 Therefore,
an individual who has the right to occupy the apartment may sublease it to a third party and still have the amount of his assessment
classified in the eighty per cent of the gross income derived from
03
tenant-stockholders.
The condominium's advantage lies in the fact that there is no limit
upon the amount of gross income derived from sources other than the
individual apartment owners. The deduction for mortgage interest
and property tax'0 may be taken by the individual unit owner regardless of the proportion of gross income derived from rentals.' This
result flows from the fact that each unit is treated separately for
99. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 216(b) (2).

100. Rev. Rul. 654, 1958-31 Cm. BULL. 58.
101. "The sale of floor space in a cooperative apartment building, which has been
incorporated as a cooperative apartment corporation, to a banking corporation, or real
estate partnership, to be used for commercial purposes will not prevent the cooperative
apartment corporation from being classified as a 'cooperative housing corporation'
within the meaning of section 216 (b) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
provided that 80 per cent of its gross income is derived from tenant-stockholders who
are individuals." Rev. Rul. 421, 1958-2 Cum. BurL. 112.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.216-1(c) (2) (1957).
103. See note 70 supra.
104. See note 1 supra, for the deductions allowed a condominium-homeowner.
105. See Kerr, Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JohN'S L. REv.
(1963).
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property taxes and mortgage purposes. Therefore, the problems
inherent in the blanket assessment and mortgage interest of the cooperative are not present.
Both the owner of a condominium unit'0° and the tenant-stockholder
in a cooperative housing corporation'0 7 may now take an allowance for
depreciation if the unit is used in business or held for rental. Previously, the deduction had been denied the tenant-stockholder in the
stock cooperative because his investment represented an investment
in such stock only, and no part of it could be allocated to the lease
rights acquired with such stock.10 8 However, the Code was amended
and the tenant-stockholder may now deduct depreciation "to the
extent such proprietary lease or right of tenancy is used by such
tenant-stockholder in a trade or business for the production of
income." 0 9 Therefore, the condominium offers no advantage over the
cooperative in this respect.
On the whole, the condominium is superior to the cooperative in
regard to the tax treatment accorded it when commercial or residential units are held for rental purposes since the condominium is
not limited in the proportion of income derived from non-residential
apartment owners. Prospective developers are certain to prefer it to
the cooperative.
Assuming a developer finds practical justification to include within
the condominium plans commercial or residential rental units, he
will be confronted with several alternatives. First, he can include
these units in the common elements of the individual residential
units; second, he can sell them to an investor; or finally, he can retain
the units for his own investment. The subsequent analysis will seek
to determine which of these alternatives should be chosen and what
tax and functional consequences will flow from the choice.
XI. TAx TBEATTMENT OF THE CONDOMINIUM AssOCIATION
The analysis will begin with the consequences of the inclusion of
the commercial units in the common elements of the individual
owners. The immediate result is that each individual apartment
owner takes an undivided interest in the commercial units. This has
the effect of requiring the apartment owner not only to purchase a
fee simple interest in a place of residence, but also to make an investment. Necessarily, the cost of the apartment unit would be increased
to the extent of the proportionate value of the undivided interest in
106.
107.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 167(a).
§ 216(c).

108. Rev. Rul. 162, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 48.
109. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 216(c).
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the commercial units. While this may prove attractive to some
potential owners, others may not wish to have their investment choice
made for them. Assuming that the forced investment choice is not
undesirable in itself, the question arises as to the tax treatment
accorded the rental income. Specifically, can the condominium be
established in a manner to avoid double taxation? The answer lies
in the nature of the association established to conduct the business
of the condominium.
The condominium needs some form of management, for the by-laws
are not self-executing. If the condominium is composed of more than
a few individual owners, it would seem to preclude their active
participation in the day-to-day operations of the condominium. Therefore, a management association must be established. Such management can be achieved by an incorporated or incorporated association," 0 the choice of which will be governed by both tax and private
law considerations.
If the corporate form is selected, the apartment owners may be
able to achieve limited liability not generally attainable in the
unincorporated association."' However, this limited liability is not
without cost. If the incorporated association handles the renting of
the commercial units and the individual apartments retained for rental,
it will be taxed on the receipt of the rental income. 1 2 If this rental
income is subsequently distributed to the apartment owners proportionately, they will receive dividend income.1 3 While this double
taxation may not be undesirable to some owners, others are certain
to prefer to make an investment which is directly taxed to them.
It is questionable whether this double taxation can be avoided if
the apartment owners establish an unincorporated association. If it
has the characteristics of an association, as defined by the regulations,
then it will be classified for tax purposes as a corporation. The
regulations provide that the presence of the following characteristics
will cause an organization to be classified as an association:
(i) Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v)
liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property and (vi) free
transferability of interests. Whether a particular organization is to be
classified as an association must be determined by taking into account the
presence or absence of each of these corporate characteristics. . . . An
110. See Berger, supra note 64.
111. It should be recognized that the managing corporation might tinder certain
circumstances be treated as simply the agent for the owners. Or the doctrine of
"piercing the corporate veil" might be invoked if the association carries on its business
in a fashion incompatible with the corporate form. See id. at 1007-08.
112. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (5).
113. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(7).

1965 ]

NOTES

1793

organization will be treated as an association if the corporate characteristics are such that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation
than a partnership or trust. 114

Analysis indicates that the condominium management association
closely resembles the regulation's definition of an "Association."
An objective to carry on business for profit and associates are
essential characteristics of all organizations engaged in business for
profit.11 5 The absence of either will cause the arrangement among
co-owners not to be classified as an association." 6 Certainly, the
owners of the individual units would be considered associates.
Whether the condominium association is engaged in a business for
profit when it rents commercial or apartment units is a closer question.
In the case of an investment trust, the mere holding of the property
under a trust indenture, which contains no powers beyond those necessary for the preservation of the trust property and the collection of
income therefrom, did not constitute more than a strict trust, and not
an association taxable as a corporation." 7 The regulations provide:
"Mere co-ownership of property which is maintained, kept in repair,
and rented or leased does not constitute a partnership."" 8 However,
a recent case held that trusts which had as their principal assets apartment buildings were conducting a business for the purposes of sharing
gains therefrom where the trust saw to the physical maintenance of
the buildings, the rental of the apartment units, the hiring of the
janitor, contracting for repairs, and collection of rents." 9 It seems
that these activities would be necessary in the operation of the
commercial units by the condominium association. Therefore, associates and an objective to carry on business appear implicit in the
condominium context.
Once these two characteristics are found, it is necessary to look to
the other characteristics to determine if the owners of the individual
units will be taxed as a partnership or a corporation. "An unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an association unless such
organization has more corporate characteristics than non-corporate
11
characteristics." 20 Continuity of life is implicit in the condominium.
The condominium is designed to last for the life of the building or
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1960).
Ibid.
Commerce Trust Co., 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1331 (1944).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1963).
Mid-Ridge Inv. Co. v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960).

121. "An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,

retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution of
the organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
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until a majority of the unit owners vote for dissolution. 122 The death
or withdrawal of an individual owner will not cause its dissolution.
Since each owner is free to sell his interest, it is clear that the condominium property is freely transferable.lm2 The fact that the condominium has a right to a first offer may result in this characteristic
being given less weight, but it does not negate it. The regulations
provide:
If each member of an organization can transfer his interest to a person who
is not a member of the organization only after having offered such interest
to the other members at its fair market value, it will be recognized that a
modified form of transferability of interest exists. In determining the classification of an organization, the presence of this modified corporate
characteristic will be accorded less significance than if such characteristic
were present in an unmodified format.124

Therefore, free transferability, at least as far as planning is concerned,
must be considered present.
Perhaps the most difficult characteristic to determine within the
condominium context is that of centralization of management. In a
condominium of any size, it is obvious that all of the owners of the
individual units cannot sign each contract entered into by the condominium. Necessarily, these functions must be delegated to a
managing association. The regulations provide:
Centralized management means a concentration of continuing exclusive
authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of the organization which do not require ratification by members of such organization.
Thus, there is not centralized management when the centralized authority
is merely125to perform ministerial acts as an agent at the discretion of a
principal.

It would appear, therefore, that if the management organization has
ultimate authority to make decisions binding upon the individual unit
owner, there is centralized management. The more individual members the condominium has, the more likely there is to be centralization
of management.'2 These are rough guidelines and leave uncertain the
intermediate situations. For example, it has been said that in the
typical condominium the association has considerable authority, but
122. See 14 HAsINcs L.J. 270 (1963).
123. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1) (1960).
124. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
125. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1960).
126. "The effective operation of a business organization comprised of many members
generally depends upon the centralization in the hands of a few of exclusive authority
to make management decisions for the organization, and therefore, centralized management is more likely to be found in such an organization than in a smaller organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (2) (1960).
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must often seek approval of the unit owners before major expenditures
are undertaken. 2 7 Thus, proper planning might eliminate the centralized management. However, in the larger condominium, practicalities would seem to preclude anything but a centralized form
of management.
The one association characteristic missing from the condominium
is limited liability. Limited liability is not generally enjoyed by the
128
unit owners of an unincorporated management association.
It would appear that four of the six characteristics of the regulations'
definition of association are generally found in the condominium:
associates, objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, continuity of life, and free transferability of interests. The fifth
characteristic, centralization of management, may also be found.
Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that the condominium will be
taxed as a corporation even absent limited liability. While the double
taxation resulting therefrom may not in itself be sufficient to prevent
the inclusion of the commercial units in the common elements, it is
a factor to be considered when selecting among the alternatives suggested above.
Even if the condominium association is taxed as a corporation,
consideration might be given to eliminating the double taxation
aspect by using the income from the rental units to off-set the
operating expenses of the condominium. This -would be reflected
in reduced assessments to the individual unit owner. There appears
to be a split of authority on the effectiveness of this scheme. In
Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Commissioner,2 91 the Tax Court was
confronted with a case in which a non-profit, but not tax exempt, water
irrigation corporation sold water exclusively to its shareholders. The
corporation also had income from other sources. The corporation
fixed its water charges to its shareholders below cost so that its water
and non-water income together would annually approximate its
water costs and leave it without profit. The Commissioner asserted
that the expenses incurred by Anaheim in delivering water to its
shareholders were not deductible expenses to the extent that they
exceeded the proceeds received by Anaheim from the sale of the
water. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner and held that to
the extent that the water costs were in excess of the charges to the
shareholders for such water or water services, the expenses were not
deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under section
23(a) (1) (A) of the 1939 Code and section 162 of the 1954 Code. The
127. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63
987, 1000 (1963).
128. Id. at 1009.
129. 35 T.C. 1072 (1961), rev'd, 321 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 30 It agreed that the Commissioner's argument that expenditures made for production when it
is not intended that they will be recouped out of product sales is not
an ordinary expense of the business, would be
persuasive in the case of a taxpayer carrying on business for profit, and
perhaps even in other cases. But Anaheim's expenditures must be determined
ordinary or not on the basis of what is ordinary for business of the nature
and scope of Anaheim's . . . Anaheim's articles of incorporation require
that it furnish and deliver water to those of its shareholders who desire
to purchase water, at net cost, that is, cost after the application of its
expenses of all incidental incomes it derives in its operations. This requirebe used
ment results from the provisions that all of Anaheim's income shall 131

to accomplish the furnishing of water to shareholders without profit.

The Ninth Circuit's rationale would seem to permit the condominium
association to eliminate all taxation of income derived from its rental
sources as long as it adjusts its assessments to eliminate any excess of
income over costs. This, of course, depends upon whether it qualifies
as a non-profit organization within the meaning of that case. The
services rendered to the condominium owners would seem to be as
non-profit as those rendered to Anaheim's shareholders, especially in
view of the present tax policy not to consider the occupancy of a home
as imputed income.132 While the rental of the commercial and apartment units is a business for profit, so was the source of the non-water
related income in Anaheim.
After the Tax Court's decision in Anaheim, but before the Ninth
Circuit reversed, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with substantially the same issue.13 In this case the taxpayer undertook to reduce
rental obligations of shareholders by the amount of nonshareholder
income. In following the Tax Court's result in Anaheim, the Seventh
1
Circuit found the "two cases cannot be legally distinguished." 34
The Seventh Circuit held that to the extent that the taxpayer had
credited its shareholders with nonshareholder income it could not
treat its expenses in providing services and facilities to its shareholders
as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. It would appear,
therefore, that the Seventh Circuit would find the condominium
association taxable in the amount of the income received from its
130. 321 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1963).
131. Id. at 258 (Emphasis added).
132. See note 1 supra.
133. Chicago & W.I.R.RI. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), reversed on
rehearing, 310 F.2d 380 (1962). After the first decision, Congress enacted P.L.
87-870 adding a new Code section 281. This gives special relief to terminal railroad
corporations and their shareholders from the effect of the Anaheim and Chicago &
W.I.R.R. cases. However, the rationale of these cases applies to all other corporations.
134. 303 F.2d at 801.
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rental units, even if the assessments of the individual owners were
adjusted to off-set these profits.
If such a result follows, then the next question is whether the
profits derived from the rental units are constructive dividends to
the unit owners. The regulations provide:
(a) General Rule. Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's
possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year during
which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or so that he
could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention
to withdraw had been given. 1 5

It would seem that if the management association used the profits of
the rental units to reduce the assessments to the individual unit
owners, this would constitute a crediting to the owner's account. If
so, then the Tax Court's decision in Julius C. Winkelman 36 makes the
last step in the constructive receipt of dividends complete. There
the court held that income credited to a taxpayer to off-set charges
made was constructively received; and, therefore, constituted taxable
income.
The above analysis indicates that if the commercial or rental units
are included in the common elements of the individual owners, there
is a strong likelihood that the condominium association will be taxed
as a corporation. The effectiveness of off-setting income from the
commercial units against operating costs incurred by reducing the
assessment of the individual owners appears to depend upon the
particular circuit. The Commissioner has neither acquiesced nor refused to acquiesce in the Anaheim case.137 It seems reasonable that
the Commissioner, when confronted by an off-setting of income in the
condominium, will attempt to have the income taxed to the association
even in the Ninth Circuit. Otherwise, possibilities of tax avoidance
schemes will permeate future mixed condominiums. Even if the
association should ultimately prevail in its contention that the income
can be off-set by cost of services to unit owners, there is every prospect
of expensive litigation. Therefore, in view of the likely litigation and
the closeness of the issue, tax planning based upon the Anaheim
decision seems dubious.
This analysis concludes that there are few tax advantages to be
gained by the individual owners retaining the commercial units in
the common elements. It must be recognized that this is a forced
investment, and perhaps the individual owner would prefer to make
his own investment choice. Also, a potential homeowner might prefer
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1957).
136. 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 640 (1943).
137. 1 CCH 1965 STAND. FED. TAX Rm'. ff 81,241.
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to remain just that, and not to make additional investment in a
commercial enterprise. There may be a market for condominium
units with an investment element, but in the absence of a strong
potential market for this type of condominium, it is suggested that the
developer either retain these units or sell them to an investor.
The choice of either of these alternatives raises problems, and the
subsequent sections of this note will explore some of these. While the
discussion will assume that the developer has retained the units, it is
obvious that the analysis is also applicable to the investor who
purchases the units.
XII. RECONCILIATION OF VOTING RIGHTS
A functional problem inherent in permitting the developer to
retain apartment or commercial units for rental is reconciling the
voting control exercised by the owners of the condominium. Since the
owners of the individual units collectively own the entire condominimum, they possess the right to manage its affairs. In the cooperative, each member has one vote regardless of the value of his
interest.1.8 But in the condominium, the weighing of the votes is
of
generally determined by the proportion which the basic value 139
the unit bears to the total value of all units in the condominium.
This method is required by the FHA as a condition precedent to the
issuance of mortgage insurance on the individual unit. 140 The FHA's
distinction between the cooperative and the condominium is based
upon a desire for adequate protection for its guarantee of the
mortgages.' 41 If the FHA was required to foreclose on the cooperative,
it would take over the entire unit, for the mortgage on a cooperative
is a blanket mortgage on the building. However, in the condominium
arrangement, each owner obtains a mortgage on his separate unit.
Therefore, if the mortgagee were required to foreclose, the FHA
would acquire only the individual unit. The FHA feels that it will
have adequate protection only if it has a voice in the management
equal to the proportional value of the unit.14
A functional problem arises when the developer retains units comprising a substantial percentage of the value of the condominium.
If the voting power is proportioned strictly on the value of the
interest, then the developer may have a dominant voice in the management. This would certainly be true where the retained units consti138. See 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1014 (1963),
condominium with the FHA cooperative.
139. Ibid.
140. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26 (1962).

141. Supra note 138, at 1024.
142. Ibid.

for a comparison of the FHA
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tuted more than fifty per cent of the value. It would seem that in
many instances the interests of the developer as an investor in
rental units would conflict with those of the individual unit owners,
whose dominant interests are those of a homeowner. Of course, the
declaration could exclude the developer from any voice in the
management. This would not seem to violate the policy of the FHA
as regards individual units insured. Of course, the developer would
not qualify for FHA mortgage insurance, but since this insurance is
limited to no more than four units per owner, 1 43 and the developer will
probably need conventional financing anyway. However, the developer and his conventional mortgagee will no doubt be unwilling
to have all decisions regarding the building determined by the apartment owners. Therefore, a method to reconcile these interests is
necessary.
It has been suggested that to base voting power on all matters
effecting the condominium strictly in conformity with economic
interests is undesirable. 144 When the decisions are economic in
character, then perhaps the economic test is proper. However, many
decisions are basically social in nature, and in this area the economic
test loses much of its appeal and unduly favors the owners of the
more expensive units. It was suggested that the economic interests
could be decided on the basis of the economic test, whereas the social
questions by a majority of those owners affected. 145 Such a distinction
might be helpful in reconciling the conflicting interests of the developer and the homeowner. However, it is recognized that even with
such a distinction a potential conflct exists, for the developer's interest in economic matters would seem to be to minimize expense in
order to maximize profit. This could conflict with a desire on the part
of the homeowner to make his place of abode as attractive and
liveable as possible, with economic considerations playing a secondary
role.
One method of reconciling these conflicting interests and remaining
within the criteria of the FHA would be to differentiate the common
elements. 1 Some statutes permit the reservation of particular common elements' 47 for the use of certain units to the exclusion of
others. 1 These limited common elements may be advantageously
used in the mixed commercial and residential condominium. For
143. See note 49 supra.
144. 37 TuL. L. REv. 482 (1963).

145.

ibid.

146. For example, roofs, halls, lobbies, parking areas, elevators, heating equipment,

the FHA regulations concerning mortgage insurance would not seem to preclude their
use.
147. FLA. STAT. ANN § 711.03(11) (Supp. 1964).
148. Common expenses can also be allocated according to the benefit derived. See
note 2 supra.
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example, the high rise condominium could have a swimming pool
and sun deck on the roof as common elements appurtenant to the
individually owned apartments, but not part of the common elements
of the commercial units. In fact, even the rental apartment units
could be excluded from participation in certain elements with a provision that, if subsequently sold, the purchaser might pay a sum to
obtain an undivided interest in these common elements. Since only
those persons having the dominant economic and social interest in
these areas hold title to them, the conflict between the developerinvestor and the apartment owner is lessened in a particularly sensitive area.
There still will remain elements common to both the rental units
and the individually owned apartments,'149 but the interests of the
investor and the apartment owners begin to coincide in regard to
these facilities and there is less likelihood of a conflict of interest.
However, it might be preferable to place in the condominium declaration a provision calling for arbitration in the event of a conflict over
maintenance or additions or improvements to the common elements
when the developer and a majority of the owners of individual units
take opposing views. In some cases, such as changes in the parcels
held by the condominium, unanimous approval by all of the owners,
including the developer, may be required.
XIII. CONDOMINmUM DEVELOPER AS A DEALER-TAX

PROBLEMS

If the condominium developer retains certain units for rental,

whether individual apartments or commercial units, it is reasonable
to assume that at some future date he will consider the possibility
of selling these units. Upon such an occurrence, the question will
arise whether any gain will be treated for tax purposes as ordinary
income or capital gain. The answer must be determined under sections 1221 and 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 1221
defines capital asset, but excludes "property, used in his trade or
business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade
or business." 50 An apartment building constructed for the purpose of
renting the apartments has been held to be property used in a trade
or business.' 5 ' Therefore, rental condominium units would be excluded from 1221, but may qualify for 1231 treatment.
Section 1231 provides that real estate used in the taxpayer's trade
149. For example, roofs, halls, lobbies, parking areas, elevators, heating equipment,
and land.
150. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(c).

151. M.A. Paul, 18 T.C. 601 (1952), aff'd, 206 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1953).
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or business may produce either capital gain or ordinary loss. 15 2 But
here again exclusions become all important. The first is for "property
of a kind which would properly be includable in the inventory of
the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year." 153 This
exclusion is relatively unimportant to the condominium developer
for real estate is not generally inventoried. 154 But the exclusion for
"property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in -the
ordinary course of his trade or business" 155 creates the major difficulty
in this area. In order for the condominium developer to obtain
capital gain treatment, it is necessary for him to avoid this exclusionary
proviso. Judicial shorthand has caused the inquiry into whether the
property is held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business to be a determination of whether the owner is a "dealer" with
regard to the property resulting in the gain. 156 While the language
of section 1231 places the emphasis on the nature of the property
itself and the manner and purpose for which it is held, the dealer
concept focuses principal attention on the owner of the property and
57
his business activities.
Although it is recognized that the owner of real property may
occupy the dual role of an investor and a dealer in real estate, 5 8 his
lot is not as simple as that of the dealer in securities. The latter
may earmark securities held for investment by so identifying the
securities on his records and not thereafter holding them primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. 159
But the real estate dealer does not have such a provision available.
He must establish by evidence that he is holding the property as
an investment. His problems are further complicated by the fact
that the Internal Revenue Service takes the position that a dealer
in real estate is presumed to hold all his real estate for sale in the
ordinary course of business, 160 although this is, of course, a rebuttable
61
presumption.'
In seeking to ascertain avenues by which a condominium developer
152. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(a).
153. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(b)(1) (A).
154. Willard Pope, 28 B.T.A. 1255 (1933), rev'd on other grounds, 77 F.2d 599
(6th Cir. 1935).
155. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(b)(1)(B).
156. Dean, Tax Aspects of Real Estate Developments, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED.
TAX 137 (1960); Levin, Residential Developments: Disposition of Unimproved Land,
N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED.TAx 149 (1956).
157. See Emmanuel, Capital Gains For Real Estate Operators, 12 U. FLA. L. REv.
280 (1959).
158. Walter R. Crabtree, 20 T.C. 841 (1953); Nelson A. Farry, 13 T.C. 8 (1949).
159. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1236.
160. Emmanuel, supranote 157.
161. Ibid.
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may retain some of the units for a rental investment and still avoid
the dealer classification in regard to these units, the examination of
authorities will concentrate upon those tending to bear upon the
peculiar aspects of condominium. It should be noted at the outset
that because the determination of the dealer status is one dependent
upon the facts of the particular case, there is no "landmark" decision
in this area despite a great number of cases considering the problem. 162
Particular emphasis will be placed upon the initial planning of the
condominium so that there will be greater likelihood of the developer
receiving capital gains treatment. While the cases to date have
involved situations in which a developer of a horizontal subdivision
has retained some of the units for rental or a dealer in the business
of purchasing houses or apartments for resale has retained some
for rental, the principles derived from these cases should control
subsequent ones involving high rise condominiums.
The general approach to the issue of whether the owner is a
dealer or investor in regard to the properties sold is epitomized by
the Tax Court's statement in D. G. Bradley.163
The question is essentially one of fact with no single factor being decisive.
The purpose for which the property was acquired; the substantiality, frequency, and continuity of sales; the activity of the taxpayer and those acting

for him; and the treatment of the property in the taxpayer's records are all
to some extent determinative of the purpose for which the property was held
during the period in question. 164

Although the statement indicates the factors a court will look to, it
does not purport to indicate the weight accorded to any particular
factor. This weighting varies from court to court, sometimes resulting
in different conclusions based upon substantially similar facts. 165 While
the uncertainty engendered by the inconsistent decisions is subject
to criticism, this note will not seek to enter this thicket and will
concentrate on avoiding the pitfalls, albeit inconsistent ones, encountered within the condominium context.
Even though the condominium developer constructs certain of
the units for resale, where other units are constructed and held
primarily as an investment for rental revenue, they will not be
classified as property held "primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of trade or business" simply because of the resale
units. 166 If the condominium developer intends to rent or sell the
162. Pennell, Capital Gains in Real Estate Transactions, TUL.
FED. TAx 23 (1959).
163. 26 T.C. 970 (1956).
164. Id. at 977.
165. See Pennell, supra note 162.
166. Nelson A. Farry, supra note 158.
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unit, whichever proves the more profitable, then no doubt he will
be held to have manifested an essential purpose to sell.167 As a
corollary to this, if he intends to sell some of the units and retain
some for rental, but fails to delineate between the two types and
stands ready and willing to sell a unit whenever favorable offers are
received, the developer will be declared a dealer in regard to all the
units.

1 68

It is, therefore, apparent that the condominium developer must
exercise sagacity in establishing by outward manifestations a clear
investment intention. One method of accomplishing this is by segregating on the records of the developer the two types of units."' 9
Another method is by taking title to the rental units in a separate
corporation created for this purpose. 170 However, care must be exercised to avoid the creation of a personal holding company.' 7 ' Prior
to 1964, if the gross amount of rents equalled fifty per cent or more
of the gross income of the corporation, such rents were not considered
personal holding company income.17 2 The 1964 Act has tightened
the personal holding company provision with respect to rents. It
requires the inclusion of the adjusted income from rents unless two
requirements are met. The first is that adjusted income from rents
must constitute fifty per cent or more of the adjusted ordinary
income. 173 The adjusted income from rents is determined by reducing gross rents by deductions for depreciation and amortization,
property taxes, interest, and rent paid.' 74 The second requirement
is that personal holding company income from sources other than
rents and use of corporation property by shareholders, and including
as personal holding company income copyright royalties and the
adjusted income from mineral, oil, and gas royalties, be not more
than ten per cent of ordinary gross income as defined in section
543 (b) (1) .1- Section 543(b) (1) defines ordinary gross income as
gross income determined by excluding gains from the sale or other
disposition of capital assets and all gains from the sale or other
disposition of section 1231(b) property. While the 1964 Act generally
necessitates a greater proportion of rents to avoid the personal holding
167. Rollingvood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
168. Municipal Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20 (1963).
169. Delsing v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1951); Palm Homes, Inc., 11
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 28 (1952).
170. Levin, supra note 156.
171. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 543.
172. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 543(a)(7), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 543(a)(7)
(1964).
173. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 543(a) (2) (A).
174. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 543(b) (2) (A).
175. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 543(a)(2)(B).

1804

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

company provisions, a corporation or association taxed as a corporation engaged exclusively in the business of renting would avoid its
provision.
Once the condominium has been constructed, the developer should
refrain from placing "for sale" signs on the investment units and
carefully exclude them from any advertising of the units intended
for sale.' 76 A long-term mortgage on the rental units will tend to show
their investment character, 177 especially
if the mortgage application
178
form states an intention to rent.
The adequacy of the rental income itself may indicate the character
of the holding. An inadequate or nominal 7 9 rental income tends to
show that the holding is temporary, consistent with an intent to sell
in the ordinary course of business. 80 In other words, a court may look
to see if it was a good investment in order to determine if it was
an investment in fact. 181 In C. T. Grace,'8 2 the Commissioner advanced a theory that would have in effect negated the showing of
substantial rental income as a positive factor indicating an investment purpose. The Commissioner argued that it is necesary for
one dealing in rental property to hold the property for a period in
order to have a record of income for a prospective buyer to estimate
his return on the ensuing investment. The court rejected this argument, noting that it might be wise for a dealer of apartment houses
to have an earnings record to show a prospective buyer or a fully
rented apartment when he sells so that, in effect, he would be selling
a going enterprise rather than just a bare building. But the court
said it would look to the facts peculiar to each case, and the facts
of Grace, especially the fact that the apartment had been rented for
over four years, demonstrated an obvious investment purpose. Grace
also demonstrates the importance attached to the length of time
the property is held for rental purposes. However, rental during a
delay caused by a failure to find customers to purchase the unit
will not convert the unit from one held for sale to customers into a
83
holding for investment.
176. James R. Baer, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 458 (1952).
177. ibid.
178. C. T. Grace, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1313 (1961).
179. Heebner v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 228 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 921
(1960).
180. As will be noted subsequently, inadequate rent may also be evidence of an
intent to liquidate a rental business.
181. Bradley v. Commissioner, supra note 163.
182. Supra note 178.
183. Neils Schultz, 44 B.T.A. 146 (1941); "The fact that 69 houses were rented
is not inconsistent with a purpose to hold the houses primarily for sale . . . particularly
where, as here, the houses were rented for varying periods of from 9 to 20 months."
Alice E. Cohn, 21 T.C. 90 (1953).
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The method of renting may also be of importance. In Louis
Rubino,1' the court, in ruling that the taxpayer was holding property
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business,
stressed the fact that the dwellings were rented on oral leases on a
month-to-month basis, and indicated that this was strong evidence
that he wished to keep his property readily available for sale. A
functional problem may be presented where the lessees prefer a
month-to-month oral lease. An option to purchase in the lease may
also be considered as a manifestation of an intent to sell rather than
to hold for investment. 8 5
The ultimate question in the resolution of the dealer issue is the
86
purpose for which the property is held at the time of sale.1 Of
course, this statement cannot be taken literally, for at the instant
the property is sold there was necessarily an intention to sell.187
What the courts seem to mean is whether an investment purpose
existed just prior to sale. 1 But regardless of the terminology, the
finding is particularly important where the investor seeks to liquidate
his rental properties previously held for an investment purpose. It
seems perfectly obvious that an investor should not be required to
keep his investment in perpetuity. However, the weight accorded
to the character of the holding prior to liquidation varies among
the courts. 18 9 Some courts hold that the fact that the property is sold
for purposes of liquidation does not foreclose a determination that
a trade or business is being conducted when the frequency or continuity of the transactions claimed are sufficient to show a business
status.' 90 Even these courts would seem to hold that where the
elements of development and sales activity are absent' 91 or insufficient
to change the investment purpose, 192 the fact of liquidation may not
be disregarded. There must be shown an abandonment of the rental
business and an engagement in the real estate business for the purpose
of selling the rental units to its customers in the ordinary course of the
new business. 93 In addition, since the ultimate question is the
purpose for which the units are held, the purpose of acquisition,
184. Louis Rubino, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. (1949), aff'd, 186 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.

1951).

185. Pacific Homes, Inc. v. United States, 230 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1956).
186. Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952).
187. McGah v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1952).
188. Ibid.
189. Pennell, supra note 162.
190. Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941); Blake v. Kavanagh, 107 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
191. Freida E. J. Farley, 7 T.C. 198 (1946).
192. Carl E. Metz, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1166 (1955).
193. Victory Housing No. 2, Inc. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1953).
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while not determinative, will be helpful in resolving the former 19 4
and the purpose for which the property was held immediately prior
19 5
to sale will be particularly important.
Other courts place greater emphasis on the fact of liquidation.'
Judge Tuttle, in Goldberg v. Commissioner,197 stated:
The test as to whether the.capital gain provisions apply in such event is, at
bottom, whether the purpose of the sales is primarily making money by
carrying on a substantial part of the activities of a person engaged in the
business of selling houses, or to dispose of or liquidate the rental business.
If the latter is the case, the owner obtains capital gains benefits.' 98

In reversing a Tax Court holding that because of the manner in

which the sales were made they were conducted in the ordinary
course of business, the court in Curtis Co. v. Commissioner,199 cited

with approval the above statement of Judge Tuttle. In Curtis the
Commissioner had conceded that if the property had been sold in

one lump sum to a buyer, there would have been capital gains. To
this the court replied:
Is the taxpayer any worse off because it did the selling itself and by single
parcels instead of job lots? We do not see how it can be fairly said so.
With the concession that up to the very minute of decision to get out of
the housing rental business the property was held for investment and with
the undisputed fact that after the rental properties were sold the taxpayer
turned its attention to other activities, we do not see that there is basis for
saying that the regular course of its business, as to these houses, was real
estate selling. We think it a case of one having an investment property
on hand which he wants to turn into another form of investment. By the
very nature of the case he had to sell the properties a piece at a time.
Surely that does not make him a 'dealer' in these parcels of land any more
than it would make a man a dealer if he wanted to liquidate his holdings
in a corporate stock for which the market was weak so that he had to sell
200
by small parcels instead of by one sale.

Other circuits20 1 and the Court of Claims 202 adopt the same rationale
and treat the frequency of sales as merely another factor for con194. Blake v. Kavanagh, supra note 190.
195. Carl E. Metz, supra note 192.
196. "One actively engaged in the business of real estate may discontinue such
business and simply sell of the remnants of his holdings without further engaging in
the business." Mauldin v. Commissioner, supra note 186, at 716; Western & So. Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 827 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
197. 223 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955).
198. Id. at 712. This principle was reaffirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Alabama
Mineral Land Co. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1957).
199. 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956).
200. Id. at 169-70.
201. Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958); Chandler v. United
States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955).
202. Garrett v. Commissioner, 120 F. Supp. 193 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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sideration in liquidation cases rather than the governing factor. But
regardless of the view of the different courts, it must be borne in
mind that the single factor having the greatest impact on all the
courts is the selling activity of the owner.20 3 It seems relatively
safe to say that, if the owner sits back and lets the purchasers approach him without attempting to attract them, in most cases, he
will receive capital gains treatment. However, this is hardly the
prevalent method of liquidating property. The condominium developer should ascertain the attitude of those courts in which he may
have to litigate the matter, and plan his liquidating activities accordingly, always seeking to minimize his sales activity.
In addition to complete liquidation, a property owner is not precluded from making frequent or infrequent sales of individual units
of his investment properties in accordance with his best judgment
for the disposition of such investment property, 204 providing the
elements of engaging in the real estate business are not present.
Perhaps here inadequacy of rent of particular units might be viewed
as particularly important.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the necessity for proper
planning on the part of the condominium developer in order to
avoid the "dealer" label. Since the problems of proof are so great,
the developer should do everything possible to establish the investment character of the rental units at the earliest possible moment and
not do it as an afterthought or wait until the Commissioner questions
the character of the sale.205 The developer should determine before
the sales activity begins the specific units he desires to retain for
rental. 216 The sales information should carefully exclude these units.
If residential units are retained for rental, excluding from the common
elements the common recreational facilities would seem to manifest a
rental-investment purpose. For example, a high rise condominium
might contain commercial units on the ground floor, rental units on
the next four floors, with the upper floors composed of individual
units held for sale to individuals. Giving only the latter owners an
interest in the common recreational facilities will preserve their
interest in having only a stable, responsible group jointly use these
facilities, while demonstrating the developer's intent to hold the rental
units as an investment.
While the condominium provides a unique opportunity to show
203. Pennell, supra note 162.
204. Ryman v. Tomlinson, 56-1 U.S. TAx CAs. ff 9519 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
205. See Pennell, supra note 162.
206. While there is authority holding that property acquired for resale can subsequently be converted into a capital asset, Gabriel Leeb, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
256 (1953), the problems of proof are greatly increased.
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the investment character of the retained units through the allocation
of the common recreational facilities, it likewise provides equally
unique problems which must be dealt with in a manner consistent
with the interests of all concerned. In the hypothetical, the sale
of an individual unit by the developer to a purchaser who desires
the unit for a residence would not create, in the absence of a specific
provision in the declaration, an interest in the new owner in the
common recreational facilities. Therefore, perhaps the new owner
should be given the right to pay an additional sum to the condominium association and receive an undivided interest in these facilities. Otherwise, the lack of these facilities would materially affect
the desirability of the rental unit as a residence, resulting, no doubt,
in a decrease in its value. Of course, provision should be made to
see that the right to purchase an interest in the common facilities is
negated where the new owner desires to retain the investment
character of the unit and rent it to third persons.
A problem of some complexity arises when the developer decides
to terminate his entire rental investment by liquidation. The right
of first refusal may be thwarted because of the need of the owners
of the individual units to purchase a large number of units to protect
their interest. They may have neither the funds nor the inclination
to enter the real estate business to dispose of the units to persons they
deem desirable joint owners. Therefore, restraints should perhaps
be placed upon the developer's right to liquidate his investment.
Such restraints should not preclude the developer from liquidating,
but reasonable restraints as to the time of liquidation may well serve
the interests of all parties. The developer would also have the
advantage of using these restraints as evidence tending to demonstrate an investment purpose in the retention of the units.
XIX. CONCLUSION

The sudden outpouring of condominium legislation has sometimes
resulted in the enabling acts containing inadequately considered provisions. In their haste to get a condominium statute on the books,
legislatures have often substantially copied the act of another state,
thereby compounding an initial oversight. While the principles of
condominium ownership are basically similar, certain provisions
which would make the condominium a more viable vehicle to meet
the needs of urbanization have been negated or ignored. For instance,
there appears no conclusive reason why a condominium may not be
created on a leasehold, or why the condominium principle should
be restricted to residential uses. As more experience with condo-
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minium is gained, it is anticipated that these and other oversights
will be corrected.
The condominium offers the developer more than simply an opportunity to construct the building and sell the units. It offers him
the opportunity through creative planning of mixed commercial and
residential condominiums to maximize the use of existing land, thereby
rendering a service to society and in the process creating a more
attractive investment.
Finally, the condominium is a vehicle useful in the resolution of
the urban housing problem. It combines many of the advantages of
home ownership with those derived from renting. Not only does it
serve the community through economy in land use, but it results in
a saving in the providing of necessary facilities such as roads and
sewage. The condominium is not the panacea of all of the problems
created by the explosive growth of our cities. However, with a
proper statutory foundation and farsighted vision on the part of
condominium developers, it may serve as one useful tool in the ultimate solution of our urban problems.
JAMs C. CLARK

